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Censorship and Two Types of Self-Censorship∗†
Philip Cook‡ Conrad Heilmann§
Abstract
We propose and defend a distinction between two types of self-censorship: public
and private. In public self-censorship, individuals restrain their expressive attitudes
in response to public censors. In private self-censorship, individuals do so in the
absence of public censorship. We argue for this distinction by introducing a general
model which allows us to identify, describe, and compare a wide range of censorship
regimes. The model explicates the interaction between censors and censees and yields
the distinction between two types of self-censorship. In public self-censorship, the
censee aligns her expression of attitudes according to the public censor. In private
self-censorship, the roles of censor and censee are fulfilled by the same agent. The
distinction has repercussions for normative analysis: principles of free speech can only
be invoked in cases of public self-censorship.
Introduction
Flemming Rose, the culture editor of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, defended
his newspaper’s publication of caricatures of Mohammed as an act of defiance against
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increased self-censorship by artists and publishers on issues relating to Islam.1 This in-
creased self-censorship, Rose claimed, was a response to intimidation from Muslims in
Europe. Whilst regretting the violence and offense caused by the publication of the
caricatures, Rose argued that principles of free speech justified taking a stand against
self-censorship caused by intimidation. Rose’s defense coheres with important liberal ob-
jections to self-censorship caused by threats and intimidation. However, as culture editor
of a newspaper, Rose also points out that suppression of certain material is required by
morality and taste. Jyllands-Posten does not publish images of dead bodies, and swear
words are usually edited out of copy. Rose again appeals to what many would regard
as considered convictions about the appropriateness of self-censorship in matters of taste,
civility, and morality. As Jytte Klausen puts it in her discussion of the Danish cartoon
incident, “[s]elf-censorship may be caused by a credible fear of retaliation and bodily harm,
but it may also follow out of respect for other people’s religious beliefs or from a desire
not to hurt people’s feelings.”2
Whilst the relationship between justifiable and unjustifiable self-censorship raises im-
portant normative questions, self-censorship also raises a prior, more fundamental ques-
tion: does self-censorship always require a censoring agent that exists independently of
the censee? Are the suppression of attitudes in response to intimidation and the suppres-
sion of attitudes in response to aesthetic values both instances of self-censorship? In this
paper we argue that while they are both instances of self-censorship, they are different
types of self-censorship. The purpose of this paper is therefore to distinguish two types of
self-censorship: public and private.3 Public self-censorship describes a range of individual
reactions to a public censorship regime. Self-censorship thus understood means that indi-
viduals internalize some aspects of the public censor and then censor themselves. Private
self-censorship is the suppression by an agent of their own attitudes where a public censor
is either absent or irrelevant. Private self-censorship therefore involves an intrapersonal
1Flemming Rose, “Why I Published Those Cartoons”, The Washington Post, 19th February 2006
2Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World, (London: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 16
3This issue has been mentioned in passing without a full analysis of its implications. For instance,
Randal Marlin states “[o]rdinary censorship typically provides us with a duality: a censoring authority
and the censored communicator. How then, where censor and censored are one and the same person,
does the notion of censorship get a foothold? We must suppose a duality within that person.” Randal
Marlin, “The Muted Bugle: Self-Censorship and the Press” in Allan C. Hutchinson and Klaus Petersen,
Interpreting Censorship in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 291. Whilst Marlin’s
insight identifies the question, he offers no discussion of this proposed duality upon which self-censorship
is based. The issue is also raised by Mark Cohen: “...is censorship only performed by a third party, or
can it also take the form of self-suppression?”, Mark Cohen, Censorship in Canadian Literature, (London:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), p. 9. Cohen argues that self-censorship is a form of censorship
because an individual can internalize public forms of censorship. Like Marlin, Cohen also fails to distinguish
public from private self-censorship, and consequently how private self-censorship should be understood in
the absence of an external censor.
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conflict between the actual expressive attitudes held by an agent and the set of permissible
expressive attitudes that they endorse.
Current debates about censorship refer to a distinction between governmental and
non-governmental restrictions on speech, and in particular whether it is meaningful to
speak of non-governmental censors such as churches, corporations, or even social norms.4
However, whether censorship is restricted to legal-political power or extended to include
social and economic power, censorship in this debate refers exclusively to a censor that
exists independently from a censee. Self-censorship is therefore understood as a censee’s
response to this externally existing censor. Yet, as suggested by Klausen, there is an
important class of cases where individuals censor themselves in the absence of an external
censor. Our paper presents a model that identifies this class of cases, and argues that
individuals can engage in a process that constitutes self-censorship in the absence of an
external censor.
Censorship and self-censorship seem to fit Bernard Williams’s notion of thick evalua-
tive concepts which include both descriptive and evaluative dimensions (where censorship
is usually evaluated negatively).5 Our model allows us to separate the descriptive and the
evaluative dimensions of censorship, and to identify and describe different types of censor-
ship regimes. Whilst our paper is primarily concerned to establish this novel descriptive
distinction between public and private self-censorship, our analysis also has evaluative im-
plications. Our model reveals that the agents and processes involved in public and private
self-censorship are substantively different, and can therefore be subjected to different nor-
mative principles. In particular, we suggest that principles of free speech may not apply
to the case of private self-censorship, because whilst an instance of censorship, the absence
of an external censor makes the censorship non-coercive.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we introduce a general model that
allows us to identify, describe, and compare a wide range of censorship regimes and we
give examples of its application. In the second section, we show how the model yields
the distinction between public and private self-censorship. In the third section we defend
the distinction against two objections that attempt to deflate self-censorship to either one
of the two types and show how private self-censorship elucidates existing conceptions of
censorship by Hobbes, Locke, Mill and Scanlon. The fourth section demonstrates the
4For an influential statement of this distinction see Fredrick Schauer, Free Speech, (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1982), pp. 122-123. A similar argument is made by Judith Andre´, “Censorship:
Some Distinctions” in Philosophical Issues in Journalism, edited by Elliot D. Cohen (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992): 77-84, p. 77, and Judith Andre´, “Poole on Obscenity and Censorship”,
Ethics, 93 (1982): 496-500, p. 499. An alternative view is presented by Lawrence C. Soley, Censorship
Inc.:, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002) and Mark Cohen, Censorship in Canadian Literature.
5Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p. 141
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usefulness of the distinction for normative analysis. We conclude that the complex phe-
nomena of censorship and self-censorship cannot be suitably discussed without recognizing
the two types of public and private self-censorship identified in this paper.
1 Modeling Censorship Regimes
In section 1.1, we propose that censorship regimes can be characterized as a process by
which censoring agents establish, justify, and enforce a goal of fit between a conception
of permissible expressive attitudes and attitudes actually expressed by censees. In section
1.2, we apply the model to the incidents surrounding publication of the caricatures of Mo-
hammed by the Jyllands-Posten which reveals the distinction between public and private
self-censorship.
1.1 The Model
Our model of censorship regimes has five elements: (1) a goal of fit between a conception
of permissible expressive attitudes and attitudes actually expressed; (2) the content of the
conception of permissible expressive attitudes; (3) the enforcement of the fit according
to the conception of permissible expressive attitudes; (4) the censor and censee; and (5)
their interaction. Note that these elements of the model do not constitute necessary and
sufficient conditions for censorship to exist. Rather, we take these as the five dimensions
on which particular conceptions or accounts of censorship regimes will provide specific and
distinctive content. We consider each of these features in turn.
The Goal of Fit One feature common to censorship regimes is the goal of creating a
fit between a conception of permissible expressive attitudes and attitudes actually
expressed. In other words, the goal of fit answers the question “why is censorship
established?” Conceptions of censorship can answer this question differently, refer-
ring to considerations such as national security, public order, or democratic freedom.
This dimension of the model makes it possible to describe the fundamental aims of
censorship regimes.
The Content of the Conception Censorship regimes include an account of the content
of their conception of permissible expressive attitudes. The content of the concep-
tion of publically permissible expressive attitudes answers the question “what is
censored?” Censorship regimes may justify which expressive attitudes are permitted
and which are not on grounds such as prudential or epistemic benefit, or moral right
and wrong.
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The Enforcement of the Fit Another feature common to censorship regimes is the en-
forcement of the goal of fit according to the conception of permissible expressive atti-
tudes. This dimension of our model answers the question “how and on what grounds
is censorship enforced?” Different censorship regimes will vary according to how they
seek to enforce their goal of a fit between a conception of permissible expressive at-
titudes and attitudes actually expressed; for instance, by using their power, their
authority, or by appealing to the content of the conception of permissible expressive
attitudes.
Agents An important feature of a censorship regime is the nature of the censor and
censee. This dimension answers the question “who is the censor and the censee?”
Censors enforce their goal of fit between permissible expressive attitudes and the
attitudes expressed by means such as their power, their authority, or their normative
viewpoint. Censees express their attitudes under these conditions.
Interaction between Censors and Censees In addition to the four elements intro-
duced, we need an understanding of the censorship process and the response of the
censees. This final dimension of our model answers the question “how do censor and
censee interact?” Intuitively, we can describe a number of ways in which censees can
respond to censorship, including various degrees of opposition, compliance, brain-
washing, or self-censorship. Here, we give a more fine-grained analysis of these broad
intuitive categories in two steps. Firstly we discuss the possible degrees of success
in the suppression of attitudes, and secondly we discuss the different dimensions of
our model to which individuals respond.
(i) Degrees of Success of Censorship Regimes. Censorship can be more or less suc-
cessful. In the perfect case, it succeeds in “brainwashing” all censees such that it creates
a perfect fit between the permitted expressive attitudes and attitudes actually expressed
by agents. Yet, many censorship regimes do not aim to change the private attitudes of
censees, as long as the censored attitudes are not expressed or not acted on. In order to
understand better the interaction between censors and censees, it is natural to suppose
that censees can have two different kinds of attitudes: those that are privately held, and
in addition those that are expressed publically. Further suppose, for simplicity, that the
censee’s attitudes to the content of the conception of permitted expressive attitudes can
take one of three values: acceptance, opposition or indifference. Crucially, in order to
analyze the degree of success in the suppression of attitudes, the values of acceptance,
opposition and indifference can characterize both the privately held and the publically
expressed attitudes of censees. Depending on how her private and public attitudes change
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in response to the censorship, any censee can respond with “perfect alignment”, “perfect
non-alignment”, and various forms of “weak alignment” between their privately held and
publically expressed attitudes. The possible combinations are listed in the following table.
`````````````````Private Attitude
Public Attitude
Public Opposition Public Indifference Public Acceptance
Private Perfect Weak “pragmatic” Perfect
Opposition alignment (1.) alignment (4.) non-alignment (8.)
Private Weak “idealistic” Perfect Weak “pragmatic”
Indifference alignment (6.) alignment (2.) alignment (5.)
Private Perfect Weak “idealistic” Perfect
Acceptance non-alignment (9.) alignment (7.) alignment (3.)
Table 1. Degrees of alignment between a censee’s privately held and publically expressed attitudes
The following list considers each cell in the table, giving examples for a censorship
regime in which the censor is public and the censored agents are private individuals:
• Perfect alignment (1. 2. and 3. in Table 1) describes coherence between private
and public attitudes. In these cases, the censored agent responds to the censorship
announcement such that there is no incoherence in the posterior attitudes:
1. Full public and private opposition, for example an active dissenter.
2. Full public and private indifference, for example an individual that is not in-
terested at all in politics or society in a dictatorship.
3. Full public and private acceptance, for example a loyal party member in a
one-party system.
• Weak “pragmatic” alignment (4. and 5. in Table 1) describes an incoherence be-
tween private and public attitudes that results in being more in alignment with the
censorship in the public attitude than in the private attitude:
4. Public indifference with private opposition, for example a cautious individual.
5. Public acceptance with private indifference, for example an even more cautious
and anxious individual.
• Weak “idealistic” alignment (6. and 7. in Table 1) describes an incoherence between
private and public attitudes that results in being less in alignment with the censor
in the public attitude than in the private attitude:
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6. Public opposition with private indifference, for example an individual with no
strong private views, but a strong sense that the censor’s attitude is publicly
offensive to some other individuals.
7. Public indifference with private acceptance, for example a party member in a
one-party system who privately endorses the censor’s view on the grounds of
ideology yet is unsure about whether such attitude should be voiced publicly.
• Perfect non-alignment (8. and 9. in Table 1) describes a maximal incoherence of
private and public attitudes:
8. Public acceptance with private opposition, for example a very cautious indi-
vidual that fears consequences for showing even public indifference towards the
censor.
9. Public opposition with private acceptance, for example someone who opposes
the censoring even if agreeing with the content of the conception of permissible
expressive attitudes.
This taxonomy expresses to what extent a censee’s attitudes are in line with those
required by the censor and how much her privately held and publically expressed attitudes
differ. This allows us, for instance, to distinguish different ways in which censees oppose
(1, 6, 9), comply (3, 5, 8) or remain indifferent (2, 4, 7) with censorship. As such, the
description above allows for quantifying degrees of success in the suppression of censee’s
attitudes.
(ii) Qualitative Dimensions of Censorship. In addition to this description of the differ-
ent degrees to which the censee’s expressive attitudes can fit the set of permitted attitudes,
there is a qualitative dimension to censees’ responses to public censorship. The extent to
which censees align their truly held and expressed attitudes with the censor can occur
for very different reasons. Recall the enforcement dimension in the model of censorship
regimes which describes how exactly a censor aims to enforce the required fit between
permitted and actually expressed attitudes. We characterize such enforcement along the
different dimensions of power (e.g. the ability to suppress expression of attitudes, such
as closing plays), authority (e.g. legitimacy to suppress the expression of attitudes on
grounds such as rule of law), external justification (e.g. a censor’s appeal to values such as
public order or human rights that are independent of their particular power and authority
to censor), and content (the censor’s appeal to the truth or validity of the content of the
conception of permissible attitudes).
In a maximally successful censorship regime, not only would all truly held and ex-
pressed attitudes of all censees be in alignment with the censor’s attitudes (i.e. a case
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of perfect alignment of private and public acceptance (3. in Table 1). All censees would
also hold such attitudes in positive regard on any dimension of the enforcement of these
attitudes: that means a censor would be feared for his power and respected for his au-
thority and hence also agreed with in the content of the attitude, and the censoring of
the attitude. However, such a case seems highly unlikely. We can therefore ask to which
of the dimensions of power, authority, external justification, and content censees respond,
and then ask whether they are responding affirmatively or negatively. Do censees express
attitudes in alignment mainly because they are afraid of the power; do they align because
they cannot bring themselves to question the authority of a dictator; do they align be-
cause they share an ideology with the censor; or do they simply agree on the content of
the censored attitude? The reverse is also possible, i.e. individuals could mainly oppose
a censorship regime and hold opposite expressed attitudes because of an abuse of power,
or the assumed authority, justification or content of a censored attitude spurs them into
open opposition. In short, using the model of censorship introduced here, we can describe
an individual’s response to censorship as any combination of the nine degrees of success
(Table 1) and the dimensions of enforcement (power, authority, justification, content) that
we can ascribe to a censorship regime.
1.2 Applying the Model
The model of censorship regimes describes the goal, the content of conception of attitudes,
the means of enforcement, the agents within a censorship regime, and the responses it can
induce, and thus allows for a range of substantively different conceptions of censorship. In
order to demonstrate the efficacy of our model, we consider the incidents surrounding the
publication of the caricatures of Mohammed by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.
We show how the various dimensions of our model apply, and how this application reveals
different instances of censorship and resultant self-censorship. The interaction between
censors and censees in the Danish cartoon incident is complex, as there were multiple
agents interacting. Application of our model brings to light the distinction between public
and private self-censorship.
We identify three different censorship regimes that are associated with the Danish
cartoon incident: (1) the public censorship regime constituted by Danish law, regulat-
ing the permissible expressive attitudes by newspapers, (2) the public censorship regime
constituted by those members of the Muslim community who opposed publication of the
caricatures and who wished to regulate issues relating to Islam in the public sphere, (3) the
self-censorship regime by the editors of Jyllands-Posten, regulating what kinds of content
they want to exclude from publishing.
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Firstly, consider the public censorship regime constituted by Danish law.
The Goal of Fit The Jyllands-Posten, like all publications, exists within a legal system
which promotes a fit between this conception of permissible attitudes and the atti-
tudes actually expressed by Danish newspapers. The fundamental aim of this goal
of fit is to maintain peace and order in Denmark.
The Content of the Conception The content of the conception of permissible expres-
sive attitudes is constituted by the moral, political, and social values of Danish
society, such as freedom, equality, and democracy. This gives substantive content to
which speech acts are impermissible.
The Enforcement of the Fit The goal of a fit between Denmark’s conception of per-
missible expressed attitudes and the attitudes actually expressed in Danish newspa-
per is enforced legally through section 77 of Denmark’s constitution which protects
freedom of speech and the freedom of the press, and sections in the Danish penal
code which forbid blasphemy (§140),6 racism (§266b), and libel (§267).
Agents The Jyllands-Posten is the censee. It is subject to a public censorship regime by
the Danish legal system.
Interaction between Censors and Censees The Jyllands-Posten was accused of break-
ing various laws governing speech acts. The Danish Attorney General judged that
there were no charges to answer under blasphemy and race hate laws, and Danish
civil courts dismissed complaints of defamation.7 According to our model, the de-
gree of alignment between attitudes held by the censee (the Jyllands-Posten), and
the attitudes they actually expressed was “perfect alignment of acceptance” (3. in
Table 1) because they accepted the political and legal framework of censorship that
allowed publication of the cartoons. Additionally we might describe the quality of
the alignment as based on an acknowledgment of the power of the Danish courts
(the courts have the power to prevent publication), respect for the authority of the
courts (assuming that the editors regard the constitution and courts as fair and le-
gitimate and therefore respect the court procedures in principle), consensus on the
moral values that the Danish constitution endorses (values that underlie the partic-
ular legal and political institutions of Denmark such as human rights and equality),
and agreement that publication of the cartoons did not violate laws of blasphemy
and defamation.
6In practice, the blasphemy law has become moribund and decisions about the publication of religious
images are governed by individual discretion, and not criminal law.
7Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World, pp. 194-196
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Thus our model identifies this as a public censorship regime. Given that conflict was
largely absent from the relationship between the Danish law and the Jyllands-Posten, it
does not seem plausible to describe the censee’s reaction to the public censorship regime
as self-censorship of any kind.
Secondly, consider the public censorship regime constituted by those members of the
Muslim community who objected to the publication of the caricatures, and who wished
to regulate the expression of attitudes about Islam and Mohammed in the public sphere.
The Goal of Fit The goal of fit between a conception of permissible expressive attitudes
and attitudes actually expressed concerns what might be described as a soteriological
understanding of the effect of representing Mohammed visually. In other words, those
who objected to the publication of the images of Mohammed claimed it was sinful
and affected a right relationship between persons and God which might prevent
salvation. So the goal of fit is to promote a right relationship between persons and
God that ensures salvation.
The Content of the Conception The content of the conception of permissible expres-
sive attitudes concerns the permissibility of representing Mohammed visually, and
an interpretation of the Koran and other religious teachings (hadith) that prescribe
rules on such visual representations.
The Enforcement of the Fit The enforcement of this fit was conducted through a
range of social, political, and economic actions by various Muslim groups, including
attempts at international denunciation at the UN,8 an economic boycott of Danish
goods in certain Muslim countries,9 and most controversially actual and threatened
violence to employees of Jyllands-Posten10 and other Danish citizens.11
Agents The censees are the Jyllands-Posten and any other newspaper or individual with
access to publishing. The censors are those parts of the Muslim community that
have threatened (and/or carried out) violence, legal action and public pressure with
regards to the publishing of the cartoons.
Interaction between Censors and Censees In this instance, the attitudes held by
the Jyllands-Posten were in opposition to the perceived censorship by the Muslim






opposition (1. in Table 1). The qualitative basis for such “perfect alignment of oppo-
sition” was the Jyllands-Posten’s contestation of the Muslim community’s perceived
power to enforce censorship, their rejection of the authority of this group of Mus-
lims to create and enforce a conception of permissible expressive attitudes, and their
rejection of a theological framework in which religious offense restricts the rights of
others to free expression.12 Jytte Klausen points out: “The cartoons were printed
around the margin of an essay, and the headline of the essay was ‘Mohammed’s
Ansigt’ which means the face of Mohammed. [. . . ] it was a cartoon editorial, it was
a provocation. [. . . ] They deliberately wanted to break a taboo and that’s why it
was printed.”13
However, the broader public reaction to the publication of the cartoons was of course
characterized by violent objection. Many publishers and news organizations refrained
from publishing the caricatures. Yale University Press, the publisher of Jytte Klausen’s
The Cartoons that Shook the World, declined to publish the cartoons on the pragmatic
ground of safety and security.14 In this case we can see that Yale University Press are
in a condition of perfect non-alignment between private opposition to the public censor
prohibiting the publication and public acceptance of that attitude by not publishing (i.e.
8. in Table 1). We may assume that this perfect non-alignment is based on a pragmatic
acknowledgment that public opposition threatens violence, a principled rejection of the
authority of any violent objectors to stifle free speech, indifference or perhaps disagreement
that there is a theological basis for objecting to the caricatures, and indifference that the
content of the caricatures is offensive.15 This analysis suggests that Yale University Press
reluctantly responded to this public censorship regime with a type of self-censorship. As
we will discuss in the next section, this non-alignment amounts to public self-censorship
because the non-alignment is in response to an external censor, which in this case is a
perceived community that threatens violence in response to the expression of an attitude
it opposes.
Thirdly, consider the self-censorship regime by the editors of Jyllands-Posten, regulat-
ing what kinds of content they refrain from publishing.
The Goal of Fit The proprietors and editors of Jyllands-Posten establish a goal of fit
between permissible expressive attitudes and the attitudes actually expressed to
12Ibid., pp. 20-27
13Jytte Klausen, “See No Evil”, Index on Censorship 38 (2009), pp. 77-78. Available online: http:
//ioc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/4/74.
14Ibid, p. vi
15Indifference here specifies what might in fact be a combination of attitudes such as that the caricatures
are not offensive in content to most Muslims but are very offensive to some.
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promote the existence and influence of the Jyllands-Posten. The goal of publish-
ing a newspaper that exercises influence is itself informed by the moral, political,
commercial, aesthetic, and professional goals of the publishers and editors.
The Content of the Conception The proprietors and editors institute a conception
of those attitudes it is permissible to express in the newspaper (constrained by
more general laws and norms), that define the format and content of the paper,
and which they believe best serves its goal of commercial, journalistic, and political
viability. These various goals may not be perfectly compatible, for example: material
they consider morally unacceptable might sell more newspapers. But whilst the
newspaper might have plural and conflicting goals, it nonetheless has a determinate
conception of the attitudes it deems permissible to express in the Jyllands-Posten.
For example, Jytte Klausen points out that the Jyllands-Posten is broadly center-
right in its political support and editorial, and that it is the largest selling Danish
broadsheet newspaper.16
The Enforcement of the Fit The newspaper enforces these rules and the content of
its own conception through its employment practices, disciplinary procedures, and
editorial decisions.
Agents The Jyllands-Posten is both the censor and the censee.
Interaction between Censors and Censees The individual journalists on the Jyllands-
Posten may have views that conflict with the conception of attitudes permitted by
the newspaper, for example they may take a different political line on a given issue,
or believe the newspaper’s copy editing suppresses good writing. We might describe
journalists who suppress such disagreements as in a condition of holding private
opposition to the policies and practices of the newspaper but expressing public in-
difference or acceptance. Our model describes such journalists as in a condition of
either weak “pragmatic” alignment (such as 4. and 5. in Table 1) or perfect non-
alignment (8. and 9.) of their own attitudes. The individuals might be responding
merely to the power of editors to hire and fire the journalists or to the authority of
the editors.
Our model also helps explicate the censorious dimensions of the notorious decision of
the Jyllands-Posten to decline to print unsolicited caricatures of Jesus on the grounds that
they would cause offense to readers.17 In the case of the suppression of the cartoons of
16Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World, p. 11
17“Danish Paper Rejected Jesus Cartoon”, The Guardian, 6th February, 2006
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Jesus, the Jyllands-Posten was acting as a censor over the attitudes of the cartoonist who
submitted the unsolicited images of Jesus. Such suppression occurs within a domain of
discretion created by Danish law and norms (expression of such images is permitted and
not required, therefore discretion is created). The decision of the editors to suppress such
publication is therefore made in the absence of a public censorship regime. This amounts
to private self-censorship as it belongs to a class of cases of censorship where suppression
of the expression of attitudes takes place in the absence of a public censor.
2 Public and Private Self-Censorship
Applying the model, we have identified two different types of self-censorship, characterized
by the presence or absence of an external public censor. We now consider the difference
between these two types of self-censorship in more detail.
2.1 Public Self-Censorship
There are various ways in which an individual may respond to public censorship. Consider
again the censorship model outlined in section 1. In order to distinguish public self-
censorship from other kinds of responses agents may have to public censorship regimes,
one can combine the nine dimensions of attitude alignment with the descriptions of how
censorship is actually enforced. In a second step, one can then identify the combinations
which may most plausibly be described as a response of public self-censorship when facing
a public censor.
Most conceptions of public self-censorship will center on those cases in which there is
some conflict between private and public attitudes, such as weak “pragmatic” alignment
(4. and 5. in Table 1), weak “idealistic” alignment (6. and 7.) or perfect non-alignment
(8. and 9.). This captures the intuition that public self-censorship involves a deliberate
effort on the part of an individual to resolve a conflict of attitudes between herself and
the censor by taking into account both idealistic and/or pragmatic concerns. It seems
particularly plausible to reserve the notion of public self-censorship for the pragmatic
responses of an individual to public censorship regimes, such as the responses of weak
“pragmatic” alignment (4. and 5.) and instances of “pragmatic” perfect non-alignment
(8.) of attitudes as outlined by our model above. To restrict public self-censorship to
a conflict between private and public attitudes seems especially plausible conceptually if
individuals respond to the power of the censor rather than to its authority or normative
justification. The more pragmatic dimensions of the enforcement of censorship capture the
idea that public self-censorship is the result of a deliberative effort in which an individual
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endorses both their private attitudes and censor’s point of view. By distinguishing different
ways to enforce the goal of fit of permissible expressive attitudes and expressed attitudes
on the basis of the power, authority, or external justification of the censor, our model can
describe the process by which an individual responds to different elements of a censorship
regime, and how this may affect a censee. For example, whilst “pragmatic” alignment
seems a plausible response to censorship enforced by power, more principled alignments
seem likely when the censee is responding to the authority or external justification of the
censor. Censees are much more likely to also privately adopt the claims of the censor on
these grounds than that of power alone.
In the light of these distinctions, consider again the case of Yale University Press and
their decision not to publish the cartoons in Klausen’s book. We can see that our model
helps specify both the nature of the censor (those members of the Muslim community who
violently objected to publication of the caricatures), and the effect of the censor on the
alignment of the attitudes of the censee (public self-censorship). We describe this as a
form of public self-censorship, as the censee has decided to suppress their original attitude
of wishing to publish the cartoons in light of the public censorship regime. Consequently,
our model allows for specification of a type of self-censorship in which the censee responds
to a censor that is external to the censee on several dimensions of our model.
2.2 Private Self-Censorship: by Proxy and by Self-Constraint
Censorship regimes may be instigated by a range of different kinds of censors, acting
for different kinds of reasons. Here, we consider one particularly interesting variance of
censoring agents, namely cases where the roles of censor and censee are fulfilled by the
same agent.
Private self-censorship captures the idea of personal restraint resulting in the suppres-
sion of privately held attitudes; that is, as an individual’s self-imposed suppression of the
expression of their own attitudes. In this context, private self-censorship is a require-
ment to adhere to certain standards, derived from, for instance, a set of norms, moral
considerations, or decency. Private self-censorship thus understood means that individ-
uals take some idea or consideration to overrule other attitudes they might have. Here,
we consider two levels for establishing such private self-censorship: either by proxy, or
by self-constraint. Firstly, private self-censorship can be established by an individual’s
internalization of some external set of values, such as the norms of an association. We
describe this as private self-censorship by proxy. Secondly, private self-censorship can be
established by an individual’s suppression of attitudes in the absence of an explicitly ex-
ternal or public influence, such as when an individual adopts a personal set of values that
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constrain the expression of their attitudes. We describe this as private self-censorship by
self-constraint.
Consider the example of Anne, Brian and Chris who are three work colleagues. Anne
and Brian both dislike Chris but say nothing. Chris moves to another job. Brian starts to
insult Chris in private to Anne. Anne shares all of Brian’s attitudes to Chris, and knows
that their private conversation could never get back to Chris or anyone else, and therefore
there could be no punishment for expressing the same attitudes as Brian. However, Anne
does not wish to express these attitudes.
The example of the colleagues can represent an instance of private self-censorship where
Anne is suppressing her attitudes by considering a conception of constraints on personal
behavior. If the sources of those conceptions are external to Anne, for instance she wishes
to abide by a code of conduct or a social norm, then we can describe this as private
self-censorship by proxy. If the motivations are much more private, for instance that she
likes to lead a life without talking behind people’s backs out of a private sense of proper
personal conduct, then we can describe this as private self-censorship by self-constraint.
The difference can be spelt out in more detail using our model of censorship, beginning
with private self-censorship by proxy:
Self-Censorship by Proxy and the Goal of Fit A goal of fit between a conception
of permitted expressive attitudes and attitudes actually expressed is constituted by
an external set of values or public institution. This goal is adopted and endorsed
privately by an agent. An agent adopts the goal of achieving a fit between the
attitudes they actually publically express, and the conception of permitted expressive
attitudes constituted by the external set of values.
Self-Censorship by Proxy and the Content of the Conception An agent adopts and
endorses privately the content of the conception of permitted expressive attitudes
of a public agent. The agent therefore endorses the content of the set of external
values, whether that is a set of social norms or political credos.
Self-Censorship by Proxy and the Enforcement of the Fit An agent enforces the
fit between the conception of publically permitted expressive attitudes and the at-
titudes they actually express, independently of whether the external set of values is
itself enforced by some other agent.
Self-Censorship by Proxy and the Censoring Agent Whilst adopting the goal of
fit, endorsing the content of the conception of publically permitted expressive atti-
tudes, and enforcing the goal of fit, the agent is regarding their own private attitudes
from the point of view of the external set of values. The agent is therefore acting
15
as the proxy of some public institution or set of independently existing values by
establishing a private censorship regime which can be described by our model.
Self-Censorship by Proxy and Interaction between Censor and Censee The con-
flict between the expressive attitudes regulated by the censoring agent and those of
the censored agent can be described by the nine degrees of alignment (Table 1) and
various qualitative aspects.
Note that as in the application of our model to public censorship, the different el-
ements just mentioned do not constitute necessary and sufficient conditions of private
self-censorship by proxy – they are rather the dimensions on which we might want to
describe those censorship regimes. We next set out the second kind of private censorship
regime: private self-censorship by self-constraint.
Self-Censorship by Self-Constraint and the Goal of Fit An individual adopts a goal
of fit between a conception of attitudes they allow themselves to express and the atti-
tudes they actually express absent reference to any external censorship regime. The
conception of attitudes they allow themselves to express may derive from a set of
moral commitments, personal political or theological principles, or pragmatic com-
mitments they endorse. The goal of fit element of self-censorship by self-constraint
points to the fact that an individual sets themselves the goal of making their ex-
pressed attitudes conformable to a set of constraints on those attitudes.
Self-Censorship by Self-Constraint and the Content of the Conception An agent
adopts and endorses the content of a set of constraints on expressed attitudes, in-
dependently of any external censorship regime. Self-censorship by self-constraint
requires that the individual finds the basis for such a conception of permissible ex-
pressive attitudes in herself.
Self-Censorship by Self-Constraint and the Enforcement of the Fit An individ-
ual enforces the goal of fit according to the authority, external justification or even
power of the conception of permissible expressive attitudes. Self-censorship by self-
constraint means that the individual will establish the resources of enforcement her-
self. For instance, an individual might use her willpower, meditation, or prayer to
find the strength to enforce the goal of fit. Or the individual will convince herself of
the authority or the normative superiority of the content of the conception.
Self-Censorship by Self-Constraint and the Agent of the Private Censor An in-
dividual suppresses their own public expression of attitudes from the point of view of
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a conception of permissible expressive attitudes that does not reduce to an external
agent of a public censor. Such a point of view could be a set of moral constraints such
as deontological or consequentialist impartiality. Or it could be a set of constraints
that is grounded in tradition or a strong conception of shared interests such as a
republican notion of “common good”. These points of view are based on a set of
moral, prudential, or political principles, and are not constituted by any particular
agent or institution.
Self-Censorship by Self-Constraint and Interaction between Censor and Censee
The suppression of expressive attitudes of the private censee by the private censor
can be analyzed according to the nine degrees of success (Table 1) and the qualitative
dimensions of enforcement. This enables characterization of the internal dynamics
of attitudes within the individual.
The two types of self-censorship identified by our model allow for analysis of a wide
range of possible conceptions of self-censorship, including those in which it is primarily a
private notion and those in which self-censorship is viewed in relation to public censorship
regimes.
3 Defending Two Types of Self-Censorship
In this section, we address some possible objections to our distinction between public
and private self-censorship. In section 3.1, we deal with the objection that public self-
censorship will always be reducible to an instance of private self-censorship. In section
3.2, we consider the converse objection, namely that whenever we talk about private self-
censorship, it just amounts to discussing a reaction to public censorship. In section 3.3
we show that private self-censorship elucidates existing conceptions of public censorship
by Locke, Mill and Scanlon.
3.1 Is Self-Censorship Always Private?
We now consider a “deflationary” objection against public self-censorship. According to
this view, all discussion of self-censorship as a response to public censorship should refer
only to self-censorship as a private censorship regime: while the self-censorship might
indeed be induced by a public censorship regime, it is best understood without reference
to it.
Such a view however, renders inapplicable a particularly useful part of our model,
namely the description of censorship outcomes according to the alignment of attitudes
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between the censee and the censor. As mentioned in Section 1, the different degrees
of success a censor can have in manipulating the censor are important to distinguish
particular conceptions of self-censorship. For instance, one might want to defend the view
that self-censorship is akin to successful brainwashing. Then, one will have to endorse the
view that self-censorship is associated with perfect alignment of attitudes between censor
and censee. To take a different example, one might want to defend self-censorship as a
particularly skillful opposition tactic, where individuals maintain their private attitudes,
but in public always act as if they are in full support of the censor’s attitudes. Then,
one will have to endorse the view that only specific instances of “pragmatic” alignment
(namely 4. and 5. in Table 1) and perfect “pragmatic” non-alignment (namely 8. in Table
1) of attitudes between censor and censee constitute outcomes that are self-censorship.
It is of course possible to maintain the view that such different degrees of success
are really just the outcomes of a much more complicated self-censorship process which is
best described in the context of an entirely private censorship regime. The latter view is
consistent with our model: one could view self-censorship in response to public censorship
as always instigating a private censorship regime which then generates different levels of
alignment with the public censor. But upholding that the censorship regime is entirely
private in all cases makes it impossible to discuss self-censorship in relation to public
censorship and the outcomes it yields. This would preclude any normative or conceptual
discussion of the effect public censorship can have on individuals in a society. While it
might be opportune to discuss self-censorship in this way in some cases, we find that
restricting all discussion to such cases would limit the understanding of self-censorship
considerably.
3.2 How Public is Private? – On the Existence of Self-Censorship by
Self-Constraint
Here we consider the converse objection: that any instance of self-censorship can be ad-
equately described as a response to a public censorship regime. We defend the existence
of the second type by returning to the discussion of the two different kinds of private
censorship regime identified in section 2.2. Whilst both private self-censorship by proxy
and private self-censorship by self-constraint fulfill the general model of censorship that
we outlined in section one, they differ from the conceptions of public censorship through
the absence of an external censoring agent.
Maintaining that there is only the first type of self-censorship amounts to claiming
that there is in fact only one kind of private self-censorship: self-censorship by proxy, such
that any instance of self-censorship must reduce to an agent acting on behalf of or from
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the standpoint of some external agent. The latter, in turn, could then be reduced to self-
censorship of the first type, namely self-censorship as a response to a public censorship
regime. We accept that what might at first appear to be self-censorship by self-constraint
may be an outcome of a certain process of self-censorship by proxy. However, the ability
of an agent to adopt a standpoint from which they can assess and regulate the expression
of their own attitudes does not depend on that standpoint always reducing to an external
agent.
In order to exemplify our notion of self-censorship by self-constraint in section 2.2,
we gave an example in which Anne suppresses the expression of attitudes on the grounds
of a private sense of how to properly conduct her life. In the proxy case, the individual
was taking the point of view of the external agent, but in the self-constraint case, the
individual is taking a point of view external to their private subjective attitudes, but not
external to their own agency. According to the objection, Anne’s self-suppression can be
traced to some public conception, such as social conventions regarding public decency.
Even if this is the case, it does not follow that Anne’s suppression is ultimately traceable
to an external agent : for an individual to reason or act from the standpoint of some
set of claims, is not necessarily to reason or act from the point of view of some external
agent. It is indeed possible to consider the content of an agent’s propositions without
considering their external agency. Thus, the objection seems to rest on conflating agency
with standpoint. Hence reducing all cases of self-censorship to public self-censorship would
limit our understanding of the processes by which agents can regulate their behavior.
3.3 Self-Censorship by Self-Constraint and Public Censorship by Proxy
The basis on which individuals may self-censor in the absence of an external agent provides
us with an important development in the understanding of public censorship regimes.
That is to say, there are some kinds of public censorship that are conceivable in terms of a
conception of self-censorship by self-constraint. In those cases, the public censor is acting
as a proxy for a set of self-constraints on individuals.
To elucidate this kind of public censorship by proxy, consider the difference in the
public censorship regimes described by Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Scanlon. In Hobbes’s
case, the entire content of the conception of publically permissible attitudes is given by
the sovereign, in virtue of their sovereignty.18 This is a clear instance of public censor-
18Hobbes’s discussion of censorship is well known for granting the Sovereign power and authority to
restrict the publication of books and the performance of public speeches. Hobbes’s argument for such
restrictions is based on the interest of the members of the commonwealth in maintaining peace and pre-
venting war: “. . . it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse,
and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be
trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes
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ship where the censor is an agent external to the censees, in the form of the sovereign.
However, not all conceptions of public censorship ascribe the content of a conception of
publically permissible expressive attitudes to an external agent. For example, in Locke’s
case, the content of the conception of publically permissible expressive attitudes is given
by positive law which relies on humans to comprehend and apply natural law according
to reason.19 Similarly, in Mill’s case, the content the conception of publically permissible
expressive attitudes is determined by the principle of aggregated utility. Again, particular
political, philosophical, and judicial agents will actually calculate and judge the content
of this principle, but this is merely incidental and instrumental to the nature of the exis-
tence of the principle, which is independent of any particular person’s conception of it.20
Farther, Scanlon has defended a “Millian” narrow conception of public censorship on non-
consequentialist grounds.21 Scanlon’s argument is derived from the audience’s interest in
being able to make decisions freely and independently and as such does not reduce to the
will or interests of an external agent as censor. Hence, in certain kinds of public censorship
regimes, such as those proposed by Locke, Mill and Scanlon, the content of a conception
of permitted expressive attitudes can be established independently of a public agent.
Whilst the content may be determined absent a public censor, is enforcement of the
conception of permitted expressive attitudes also possible absent a public censor? Our
model suggests: yes. Normative reasons may have authority based on the shared claims of
individuals. Deontological impartialist conceptions of morality, such as Scanlon’s, argue
that principles of right and wrong are authoritative if they cannot be reasonably rejected
by anyone motivated to agree on principles to regulate behavior that are acceptable to all
similarly motivated. Consequentialist impartialist conceptions of morality, such as Mill’s,
argue that principles of right and wrong are authoritative if they treat each person’s utility
equally. In other words, the constraints on individual behavior are enforced on the basis of
a normative authority that is constituted by shared authority relations between persons,
and not in reference to an interest or value that is external to the shared authority relations
between persons. Therefore, the enforcement of a conception of publically permissible
before they be published.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
Bk. 2, Ch. 18, p. 124
19John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, edited by Susan Mendus and John Horton, (London:
Routledge, 1991)
20J. S. Mill, On Liberty, edited by John Gray, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), ch. 2. A
similar argument is presented by Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, (New York: Harper, 1960)
who defends the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States as an absolute prohibition on
censorship justified because of the necessity for free speech in a society in which citizens are responsible
for democratic decisions.
21See T. M. Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2 (1972),
pp. 204-226, and T. M. Scanlon, “Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression”, University of
Pittsburgh Law Review, 40 (1978-9), pp. 519-550
20
expressive attitudes can proceed in the absence of an external public authority.
In other words, self-censorship by self-constraint allows us to see that conceptions of
public censorship that are based on second-personal normative authority are only concep-
tions of public censorship derivatively. They are primarily conceptions of public censorship
by proxy. Therefore, it is important to refute the reductivist view of private self-censorship
as being solely a private censorship regime by proxy because this not only retains a con-
ceptually distinct conception of self-censorship by self-constraint, but this refutation also
allows us to distinguish conceptions of public censorship that rely on non-agent based
content and enforcement.
4 Two Types of Self-Censorship and Normative Analysis
In this section, we show how our distinction between public and private self-censorship
can contribute to normative discussions of censorship and free speech. We firstly revisit
the events Mohammed caricatures case, and then consider conceptions of free speech.
4.1 Private and Public Self-Censorship in the Danish Cartoon Incident
Our model provides a unique explanation of the different kinds of agents involved in the
Danish cartoon incident, and the variety of possible interactions between them. This
unique account of the agents and their interactions reveals the different normative prin-
ciples that apply, and to whom they apply. Consider two very different responses to the
publication of the cartoons by the Jyllands-Posten.
The first response, voiced by the Danish government and many sympathetic newspa-
pers, was that the newspaper was justified in publishing the cartoons because principles of
free speech permit causing offense, and that it is impermissible to censor speech through
threats of violence. Our model reveals that this response recognizes the public censorship
regime of Danish law as legitimate, and the public censorship regime instituted by parts
of the Muslim community as illegitimate. As shown in section 1.1, the Jyllands-Posten
was aligned with the Danish law, yet was in conflict with parts of the Muslim community.
Hence, normative evaluation of the Jyllands-Posten’s actions as a response to censorship
requires differentiating the two public censorship regimes with which the newspaper was
interacting. Such differentiation is required because supporters of the Jyllands-Posten
would regard the Danish censorship regime as legitimate, and the censorship regime in-
stituted by that part of the Muslim community who objected as illegitimate. Therefore,
our model specifies that the normative issue at stake is a conflict between two opposing
censorship regimes, and their competing claims to legitimacy.
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The second response regards the Jyllands-Posten’s actions as morally wrong as they
caused offense, hurting the feelings of members of a minority religious group who suffer
many injustices, caused outrage and festered division between cultures. This view can be
explained by our model as a negative normative assessment of their private self-censorship
regime. For instance, one could argue that their private censorship regime was illegitimate
because it discriminated against the feelings of the Muslim community unfairly by pub-
lishing the caricatures of Mohammed but censoring the caricatures of Jesus. Note how
our model enables fine-grained distinctions within an analysis of a private self-censorship
regime: one could either criticize the Jyllands-Posten in its role as a censor or as censee.
As censor, the Jyllands-Posten institutes a censorship regime by specifying a goal of fit,
a conception of permissible attitudes, and enforcing this fit over the expression of its own
attitudes. If the Jyllands-Posten’s censorship regime endorsed a conception of permissible
attitudes that was discriminatory towards Muslims, it is morally culpable as private self-
censor. As censee, the Jyllands-Posten responds to this privately instituted censorship
regime through the publication of its newspaper. If the Jyllands-Posten’s discriminatory
approach to printing the cartoons of Mohammed and cartoons of Jesus was a result of
failing to apply a non-discriminatory private censorship regime, then it is morally culpable
as a censee.
The distinction between private and public self-censorship is particularly useful in
analyzing the more recent controversies in the Danish cartoon case. In February 2010, a
settlement between the newspaper Politiken which had reprinted the cartoons and eight
organizations representing 94,923 of the Prophet Mohammed’s descendants was reached,
with the latter dropping legal action against the newspaper. As part of the settlement, the
newspaper Politiken issued a statement in which they apologized for the offense caused
by their reprinting the Cartoons in question.22 This statement was met by harsh criticism
from Danish media, politicians and also the Jyllands-Posten: “Politiken has betrayed
the battle for freedom of speech. They’ve given up and bowed to threats. That is, of
course, disgraceful,” its Editor-in-Chief Mikkelsen said in response. The three censorship
regimes discussed earlier help to analyze these developments. Firstly, Politiken’s statement
frames the problem in terms of apologizing for failed private self-censorship. Secondly, the
statement arose in the context of a lawsuit that can be described as being part of the
public censorship regime in which parts of the Muslim community participate. Thirdly,
the Jyllands-Posten’s reaction draws on free speech, framing the problem in terms of
the perceived legitimacy of the Danish public censor and the perceived illegitimacy of
the public censorship regime by parts of the Muslim community. This suggests that the
22“Politiken Settles Mohammed Cartoon Issue”, Politiken, 26th February 2010. Available online: http:
//politiken.dk/newsinenglish/article911102.ece
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public debate about the Cartoon incident can be seen as disagreements about which of
the censorship regimes involved are legitimate and which are illegitimate.
4.2 Free Speech
As mentioned in the introduction, our model enables us to separate the descriptive and
evaluative dimensions of censorship. The preceding discussion has focused on how our
model helps clarify varieties of censorship and self-censorship regime, and in particular
how our model reveals a distinction between public and private self-censorship. We now
consider the implications of the descriptive role of our model for normative discussions.
Prominently, Fredrick Schauer argues that public censorship is characterized by the dis-
cretionary power of governments to control speech.23 Schauer’s conception of censorship
leads to him to deny the existence of private and public self-censorship: because individ-
uals are in a condition of necessary choice about their reception of speech acts, “[t]his
additional dimension of private suppression as an act of speech, or at least a corollary
to it, sharply distinguishes private from government censorship, and makes the notion of
private self-censorship almost self-contradictory.”24 Our model disputes this elimination
of private and public self-censorship and provides support for those who accuse Schauer
of holding a too restrictive view of censorship. Indeed, Schauer has been criticized for
excluding non-governmental agents such as corporations, churches, norms and cultures
that can also exercise non-necessary restrictions on speech acts, and therefore act as cen-
sors.25 Our model showed that censorship processes can produce many kinds of formal
and informal agents who can act as censors such as constitutions, governments, public
opinion, and social norms. For example, our model was able to explain the response of
those Muslims who objected to the caricatures as a public censorship regime, because they
constituted a goal of fit, a conception of permissible expressive attitudes, and sought to
enforce this conception on the Jyllands-Posten. Our model therefore clearly allows for
both governmental and non-governmental public censorship.
The ability of our model to describe a broader set of non-governmental public censor-
ship regimes has important normative implications for the application of principles of free
speech. It describes a wider set of censorship regimes; should principles of free speech sim-
ilarly widely? Schauer argues that principles of free speech only apply to public censorship
regimes because censorship does not exist outside relations between governments and in-
23Fredrick Schauer, Free Speech, pp. 122-123
24Ibid. However, Schauer goes on to grant the possibility of (public) self-censorship when a publisher
faces risks of liability, i.e. when there is the possibility that there will be legal consequences to publishing
a statement (pp. 170-171).
25For example, see Soley, Censorship Inc., and Mark Cohen, Censorship in Canadian Literature.
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dividuals. Our model has revealed that censorship relationships do exist beyond relations
between government and individuals (namely our broader conception of public censorship,
and our identification of public and private self-censorship). However, whilst our model
does identify a wider set of censorship regimes, this does not imply that principles of free
speech apply to them all.
Schauer maintains that principles of free speech are inapplicable to self-censorship
because principles of free speech do not apply to the necessary choices of individuals.
In contrast, our model can extend the application of principles of free speech to public
self-censorship. Thus, if we have a legitimate public censorship regime, then agents who
align the expression of their attitudes with it are behaving justifiably. Conversely, if a
public censorship regime is normatively problematic, for instance one that intimidates
and threatens the censees, then opposition to it is preferable to public self-censorship.
In addition, the degree of justifiability can be explained by the nine degrees of success
of censorship regimes specified by our model: the more successful at enforcement an
illegitimate public censorship regime, the less praiseworthy the individual’s alignment.
When considering private self-censorship we suggest that principles of free speech are
inapplicable, but on different grounds from Schauer. Principles of free speech relate to
coercive relationships between agents: namely a public censor and a censee. Our model
suggests that analysis of the legitimacy of censorship regimes should focus on the actions
of the censor. We agree with Schauer that it is entirely appropriate to consider such public
censorship regimes under principles of free speech. The wrong that is involved in violations
of free speech must include, inter alia, the wrong of coercing an agent to suppress their
speech against their will or interests. Can such a wrong (namely a wrong of coercion)
be performed by an individual on the expression of their own attitudes? We argue: no.
Private self-censorship does not involve an interpersonal relationship between agents as
censor and censee; private self-censorship consists in an intrapersonal relationship within
an agent where they act as both censor and censee. It is impossible for an individual to co-
erce themselves by restricting their own freedom of speech through private self-censorship,
because coercion must involve the restriction of the action of one agent by another. Coer-
cion therefore requires an interpersonal relationship. Private self-censorship, as our model
has shown, is an intrapersonal relationship. It could be objected that the model indeed
introduces two agents within one individual, the censoring agent and the censored agent,
and that their relationship can be understood as interpersonal. Even though we find this
implausible, accepting this objection does not pose a problem: both the censoring and the
censored agent are part of a private individual. Therefore, the public dimension is absent
from private self-censorship and the coercion that may be involved between the two agents
in the individual cannot be analysed by principles of free speech. Our model consequently
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allows for both a broader description of censorship and self-censorship regimes, and conse-
quently a clearer specification of the agents within such regimes. An important normative
implication is that principles of free-speech only apply within a narrow set of interpersonal
censorship relationships, and therefore that principles of free speech are inapplicable to
intrapersonal private self-censorship.
Conclusions
We have argued for a distinction between two types of self-censorship: public and private.
Applying the general model of censorship regimes which we have introduced in this paper,
we find that the two types imply different notions of censor, censee and their interaction:
in public self-censorship, the censor is a public agent, such as a government or public
authority, and the censees are private individuals or corporations. By contrast, in private
self-censorship, censee and censor are the same agent, such that the censorship process
involves the suppression of attitudes within one individual. We have distinguished two con-
ceptions of private self-censorship, namely by proxy and by self-constraint, to highlight
the degrees to which motives for private self-censorship can be external to the agent. We
find that those distinctions are relevant for the normative analysis of complex cases of cen-
sorship and self-censorship, and the interaction between censors and censees. We argued
that principles of free speech are not applicable for cases of private self-censorship. Thus,
the distinction between public and private self-censorship put forward enables clarification
of the complexities of censorship and self-censorship, and the normative and descriptive
problems associated with them.
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